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Introduction: Prior work has found varied relationships between self-reported and clinician-rated motivation
measures in schizophrenia, suggesting that moderators might impact the strength of this relationship. This
current study sought to identify whether metacognition – the ability to form complex representations about
oneself, others, and the world – moderates the relationship between self-reported and clinician-rated motivation
measures. We also explored whether clinical insight and neurocognition moderated this relationship.
Methods: Fifty-six participants with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder completed the Motivation and Pleasure
Self-Report Scale and the clinician-rated motivation index from the Heinrichs-Carpenter Quality of Life Scale.
Results: Metacognition significantly moderated the relationship; self-reported and clinician-rated motivation
were positively and significantly correlated only when metacognition was relatively high. Neither clinical insight
nor neurocognition moderated the relationship.
Discussion: Metacognition appears to be a key variable impacting the strength of the relationship between self-
reported and clinician-rated motivation measures and may help to partly explain the varied relationships ob-
served in prior work. Using a metacognitive framework to guide assessment interviews and targeting meta-
cognition in psychosocial treatments may help to improve the synchrony between self-perceptions and clinician
ratings of motivation.
1. Introduction
Motivation–an internal state that initiates and guides goal-directed
behavior (Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981)–is often impaired among
people with schizophrenia (Cooper et al., 2015; Faerden et al., 2009).
Although these reductions have long been observed in schizophrenia
(Bleuler, 1911/1950; Kraepelin et al., 1913/1919), motivation has only
recently become a major focus in schizophrenia research. This in-
creased interest is partly due to the key role that motivation plays in
social and occupational functioning and quality of life (Evensen et al.,
2012; Najas-Garcia et al., 2018; Saperstein et al., 2011).
The functional importance of motivation has led to an increased
focus on the development and validation of measures to assess moti-
vation in schizophrenia. Among the most commonly used motivation
measures are clinician-rated and self-reported measures. For example,
the clinician-rated motivation index from the Heinrichs-Carpenter
Quality of Life Scale (QLS; Heinrichs et al., 1984), which was originally
put forth by Nakagami et al. (2008), has been central to schizophrenia
motivation research. The index assesses participants' sense of purpose,
curiosity, and degree of motivation. Others have used negative
symptom motivation items or subscales from clinician-rated measures
like the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al.,
1987) or the Clinical Assessment Interview for Negative Symptoms
(CAINS; Kring et al., 2013). More recently, several self-report motiva-
tion measures have been created, including the Motivation and Pleasure
Scale-Self Report (MAP-SR; Llerena et al., 2013), which contains items
that assess participants' motivation and effort to engage in social,
school, work, hobbies, and recreational activities.
Notably, existing work suggests that the convergent validity or
strength of the relationship between self-reported and clinician-rated
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motivation measures is variable (Engel and Lincoln, 2017; Luther et al.,
2018). For example, Richter et al. (2019) found small, non-significant
relationships between the MAP-SR motivation items and the CAINS
motivation and pleasure items and PANSS negative symptom subscale.
On the other hand, Jang et al. (2016) found medium, significant cor-
relations between the MAP-SR motivation items and the PANSS amo-
tivation subscale and PANSS negative symptom subscale (Luther et al.,
2018). Further, a recent meta-analysis identified 33 studies that ex-
amined the relationship between self-reported and clinician-rated mo-
tivation measures, finding that study-level correlations ranged from
−0.11 to 0.75 and that there was a medium to high amount of het-
erogeneity among the study-level effect sizes (Luther et al., 2018).
Given these mixed associations, it may be that participant or sample
characteristics influence the strength of (i.e., moderate) the association
between self-reported and clinician-rated motivation measures. One
potential factor that may impact this association is metacognition, the
capacity to identify and then integrate mental experiences such as
thoughts and emotions into complex representations of oneself and
others (Lysaker et al., 2015). Metacognition may be a prime potential
moderator for several reasons. Without awareness of internal states, it
may be difficult to identify and report one's motivation level, related
intentions, and emotions (e.g., pleasure). It may also be challenging to
identify the frequency of a motivational state over the past week or
level of interest or desire for an activity, as is often required by self-
report motivation measures. Further, without an integrated and
nuanced representation of oneself, it may be difficult to reflect on times
when one felt motivated generally or was motivated for a specific task
or domain (e.g., school), especially without the help of guided inter-
viewer questions. Thus, people with higher levels of metacognition may
be better able to identify and report motivational states, particularly on
self-report measures. In turn, greater metacognitive capacities may
make it easier for an interviewer and participant to develop greater
shared agreement and understanding of the participant's motivation,
leading to improved concordance between self-reported and clinician-
rated measures. Indeed, this aligns with a theoretical model put forth by
Hasson-Ohayon et al. (2017), which suggests that a metacognitive
framework or therapeutic approach may enhance shared client-clin-
ician agreement and help to align the client's and clinician's narratives
of symptoms such as reduced motivation. Taken together, greater me-
tacognitive capacity may lead to greater agreement between self-re-
ported and clinician-rated motivation, such that those with higher
metacognition have a stronger association between self-reported and
clinician-rated measures than those with relatively lower metacogni-
tion.
Although no one has directly tested whether metacognition mod-
erates the relationship between self-reported and clinician-rated moti-
vation, several related lines of work provide support for this hypothesis.
First, within schizophrenia, metacognition is often impaired (Hasson-
Ohayon et al., 2015; Lysaker et al., 2014b), and these impairments have
been linked to reduced clinical insight and social cognition (Hamm
et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2011). Second, metacognition plays a role in
both self-reported (Tas et al., 2012) and clinician-rated motivation
measures (Luther et al., 2016; Vohs and Lysaker, 2014), such that those
with higher metacognition report greater motivation. Metacognition
also moderates the association between self-reported negative apprai-
sals about oneself and the future and clinician-rated social functioning,
so that lower negative appraisals were related to greater social func-
tioning only when participants had higher metacognition (James et al.,
2016). Similarly, reduced metacognition and lower clinical insight have
been linked to greater disagreement between self-reported and clin-
ician-rated measures of work quality, quality of life, and empathy
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2011; Luedtke et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2013).
Thus, with lower metacognition, there may be more discordance or a
weaker association between self-reported and clinician-rated measures.
Identifying whether metacognition also helps to explain the variability
often observed between self-reported and clinician-rated motivation
measures could clarify whether and how metacognition may impact
these relationships. Similarly, it also could help identify when moti-
vation measures may require additional supporting information (e.g.,
when metacognition is low) or when it might be important to intervene
on metacognitive capacities in order to improve a person's identifica-
tion and consideration of motivational states and to promote a greater
shared agreement and understanding between the client and clinician.
The main aim of this study was to test whether metacognition
moderates the association between self-reported and clinician-rated
motivation measures in a sample of 56 people with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders. We hypothesized that participants' metacognition
would significantly moderate the association, such that there would
only be a significant, positive relationship between the motivation
measures when metacognition was higher; at relatively lower meta-
cognition levels, we hypothesized that the relationship between the
motivation measures would be non-significant. As a secondary aim,
because prior work has linked insight to client-clinician agreement
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2011; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2017; Lysaker
et al., 2013) and neurocognition may impact one's ability to discuss and
report motivational states, we also examined whether participants'
clinical insight and neurocognition moderate the self-reported and
clinician-rated motivation relationship.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were enrolled in a randomized pilot trial of a text-
message intervention targeting motivation. Diagnoses of schizophrenia
(n=23) or schizoaffective disorder (n=33) were confirmed with the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5; First et al., 2015).
Additional eligibility included receiving services from a community
mental health center, having a text-message enabled cell-phone, no past
month medication changes or hospitalizations,≥ a fourth grade
reading level on the Graded Word List (La Pray and Ross, 1969), and
moderate motivation deficits according to the CAINS (i.e., score≥ 2 on
at least one item: motivation for family, close friends and romantic
relationships, work and school, and/or recreational activities). Most
participants were male (n=29, 51.8%) and identified as Black (n=39,
70%) or White (n=14, 25%). The mean age was 46.1 (SD=8.8), and
the mean education was 11.8 years (SD=2.4).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Metacognition
Metacognition was assessed with the Metacognition Assessment
Scale—Abbreviated (MAS-A; Lysaker et al., 2005, adapted from
Semerari et al., 2003). The MAS-A was based on participants' responses
to the Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII; Lysaker et al., 2002), a
semi-structured interview that asks how participants view themselves,
others, and their mental illness and life. IPII responses were rated on
four metacognitive domains: self-reflectivity, awareness of others'
minds, decentration, and mastery (see Lysaker et al., 2014a for more
information). For this study, we used the MAS-A total score, which has
good validity (Hamm et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2005) and demon-
strated good inter-rater reliability in our sample (Intra-class coefficient
(ICC)= 0.89).
2.2.2. Clinician-rated motivation
Following Nakagami et al. (2008), clinician-rated motivation was
assessed using the sum of the general sense of purpose, degree of mo-
tivation, and curiosity items from the QLS. Based on Choi et al. (2014),
we refer to this as an index of general trait-like motivation. Items are
rated based on the past four-weeks on a variable scale from 0 to 6. This
index exhibits good construct validity and inter-rater reliability
(ICC= 0.86 in our sample) (Luther et al., 2015; Nakagami et al., 2008).
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Of note, we focused on the QLS motivation index because the CAINS
motivation items had a restricted range based on study inclusion cri-
teria.
2.2.3. Self-reported motivation
The sum of the MAP-SR six motivation and effort items was used to
assess self-reported motivation. Items assess perceived motivation and
effort over the past week for social, work/school, and hobbies/recrea-
tional activities and are rated on a variable scale from 0 to 4. The MAP-
SR has demonstrated reliability and validity (Engel and Lincoln, 2016;
Llerena et al., 2013), and these six items demonstrated good internal
consistency in our sample (α= 0.82).
2.2.4. Neurocognition
Neurocognition was measured using the updated brief neurocogni-
tive assessment (BNA; Fervaha et al., 2015), which assesses working
memory with the letter-number sequencing test (Gold et al., 1997) and
processing speed with the symbol coding subtest from the Brief As-
sessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS; Keefe et al., 2004);
these constructs were chosen because they explained the greatest var-
iance in global neurocognition in a large schizophrenia sample
(Fervaha et al., 2014). A composite standardized z-score was created
from guidelines by Fervaha et al. (2015). The BNA has demonstrated
prior construct validity and test-retest reliability (Fervaha et al., 2014,
2015).
2.2.5. Clinical insight
Global clinical insight was measured using the clinician-rated
PANSS insight and judgement item. This item is rated from 1 to 7, with
greater scores reflecting reduced awareness of illness/symptoms,
treatment need, and illness consequences. This item has been pre-
viously used to measure insight in schizophrenia and has strong con-
vergent validity with more comprehensive clinical insight measures
(Drake and Lewis, 2003; Marks et al., 2000); PANSS inter-rater relia-
bility in our sample was good (ICC=0.84).
2.3. Procedure
After informed consent, participants completed assessments with
trained research assistants. MAS-A raters were blind to other testing.
Only baseline (i.e., pre-intervention) assessments were used in the
current investigation. Participants were compensated for completing
study procedures, which were approved by the university's institutional
review board.
2.4. Analyses
Analyses were conducted in several steps. First, we conducted de-
scriptive statistics to examine demographics and ensure study measures
met statistical assumptions. We then conducted Pearson's correlations
between study measures. For moderation analyses, we used the
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS to conduct three moderation
models. Self-reported motivation, the moderator of interest (i.e., me-
tacognition, clinical insight, or neurocognition), and the interaction
term between these variables were entered into a regression model
predicting clinician-rated motivation. Moderation was deemed present
if the interaction term was significant (p < .05) and significantly im-
proved the regression model. For significant moderators, we re-ran the
model controlling for demographic variables (age, sex, race, education)
as a more stringent test. We then used the Johnson-Newman technique
(Bauer and Curran, 2005) to identify the level of the moderator where
the relationship between motivation measures changed significance.
We also visualized significant interactions by using the pick-a-point
approach (Rogosa, 1980); we used plus and minus one standard de-
viation of the moderator.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive and correlation analyses
Table 1 contains measure descriptive statistics and correlations.
Self-reported and clinician-rated motivation were significantly and
moderately correlated (p < .01). Neither motivation measure was
significantly associated with metacognition, clinical insight, or neuro-
cognition.
3.2. Moderation analyses
Moderation results are in Table 2. Consistent with our hypothesis,
after accounting for the independent effects of metacognition and self-
reported motivation, the interaction term between self-reported moti-
vation and metacognition was significant and accounted for a sig-
nificant proportion of additional variance in clinician-rated motivation
(F change (1,52= 6.01, p= .02, R2 change=0.08). Of note, these
results were highly similar when demographics were controlled. The
Johnson-Newman technique indicated that at metacognition levels at or
above 7.54, the relationship between motivation measures was positive
and significant; at metacognition levels below this score (28.6% of our
sample), there was a non-significant relationship between the measures.
See Fig. 1 for a graph of this interaction (results of the pick-a-point
approach).
For clinical insight, the interaction term between clinical insight
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations for study measures.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Mean SD
1. MAP-SR – motivation
and effort
– 9.46 5.43
2. QLS – Motivation 0.46⁎⁎ – 7.73 2.62
3. MAS-A – Total 0.10 0.19 – 9.27 2.44
4. PANSS – Insight −0.24 −0.15 −0.47⁎⁎ – 2.82 1.18
5. BNA – Composite −0.05 −0.01 0.08 −0.03 – −1.78 1.14
Note. BNA=Brief Neurocognitive Assessment; MAP-SR=Motivation and
Pleasure Self-Report; MAS-A=Metacognition Assessment Scale—Abbreviated;
PANSS=Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Higher scores on the MAP-SR,
QLS-motivation, MAS-A, and BNA=greater levels of each construct. Higher
scores on the PANSS-Insight= lower insight.
⁎⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 2
Moderation results.
Variable Coefficient SE t p
Model 1 (Metacognition)
R2= 0.31, F=7.89, p < .001
Constant 9.13 2.36 3.87 < 0.001
MAS-A – Total −0.39 0.26 −1.52 0.13
MAP-SR – Motivation and effort −0.28 0.21 −1.33 0.19
MAS-A X MAP-SR 0.05 0.02 2.45 0.02
Model 2 (Clinical insight)
R2= 0.21, F=4.73, p= .005
Constant 5.48 1.87 2.93 0.01
PANSS – Clinical insight 0.06 0.58 0.11 0.91
MAP-SR – Motivation and effort 0.26 0.15 1.73 0.09
PANSS X MAP-SR −0.01 0.05 −0.30 0.77
Model 3 (Neurocognition)
R2= 0.22, F=4.85, p= .005
Constant 5.06 1.23 4.12 < 0.001
BNA – Composite −0.35 0.62 −0.55 0.58
MAP-SR – Motivation and effort 0.28 0.11 2.57 0.01
BNA X MAP-SR 0.04 0.06 0.67 0.51
Note. BNA=Brief Neurocognitive Assessment; MAP-SR=Motivation and
Pleasure Self-Report; MAS-A=Metacognition Assessment Scale—Abbreviated;
PANSS=Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale.
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and self-reported motivation was non-significant and did not explain a
significant amount of additional variance in clinician-rated motivation
after accounting for the effects of self-reported motivation and clinical
insight (F change (1,52=0.09, p= .77, R2 change= 0.001)).
Similarly, the interaction term between neurocognition and self-re-
ported motivation was non-significant (F change (1,52= 0.45, p= .51,
R2 change=0.01)).
4. Discussion
The main aim of this study was to identify whether participants'
metacognitive capacities help to explain the mixed relationships ob-
served in the literature between self-reported and clinician-rated mo-
tivation measures in people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
Consistent with our hypothesis, results suggest that metacognition
moderated the relationship between self-reported and clinician-rated
motivation. Specifically, we found that at low metacognition levels,
self-reported and clinician-rated motivation were unrelated. However,
as metacognition increased and at least essential metacognitive abilities
were present (i.e.,≥7.54 MAS-A score), the relationship between the
motivation measures became significant and stronger. Further, a similar
moderating relationship did not exist when clinical insight or neuro-
cognition were examined as moderators.
With replication, these results suggest that links between self-per-
ceived motivation and clinician-rated motivation break down when
metacognition is low. Specifically, we found that without a minimum of
essential metacognitive capacities, the relationship between motivation
measures was non-significant. It may be that when a person has a re-
duced ability to reflect on and identify their intentions, thoughts, and
feelings and then integrate them into a complex representation of
themselves and others that they may have a more difficult time re-
flecting on and reporting their goals and motivational states, which in
turn could lead to disagreement between self-reported and clinician-
rated motivation. Further, since the self-report MAP-SR focuses on
motivation for specific domains and the clinician-rated QLS motivation
index focuses on motivation more broadly, it may be that those with
lower metacognition have more difficulty identifying and forming a
general representation of their motivation than when identifying their
motivation for more specific domains; this could also lead to a reduced
association between the measures. Thus, for those with metacognitive
capacities below an essential level (i.e., 7.54 MAS-A score), it may be
that self-report motivation measures may be less useful as standalone
tools or that more time or attention from the interviewer (i.e., ex-
ploration and synthesis of client's experiences, awareness of potential
clashes between client-clinician narratives, including awareness that
the clinician's narrative is not necessary true; Hasson-Ohayon et al.,
2017) may be needed to develop a greater shared agreement and un-
derstanding of the participant's motivation.
This work aligns with prior studies showing that metacognition
plays a key role in the level of agreement between self-reported and
clinician-rated work quality measures (Luedtke et al., 2012) and mod-
erates the relationships between perceived stress and anxiety symptoms
and self-appraisals and clinician-rated social functioning (James et al.,
2016; Ramos-Cejudo and Salguero, 2017). Our findings extend this
work to motivation measures and identify the specific metacognition
level associated with greater agreement between self-reported and
clinician-rated measures. Further, these findings align with Hasson-
Ohayon et al.'s (2017) theoretical model positing that metacognition
may be a source of shared meaning and understanding between clients
and clinicians. Indeed, our findings in conjunction with this prior work
suggest that using a metacognitive framework to guide the interview
process and targeting metacognition with psychosocial interventions
could lead to greater concordance between self-reported and clinician-
rated measures. This may be particularly helpful for motivation mea-
sures and when intervening on motivation, as greater client-clinician
agreement and awareness of the client's motivation could facilitate
more collaborative, authentic, and meaningful goal-setting as well as
improve a client's identification and use of person-congruent strategies
that could bolster their motivation and overcome barriers to their goals.
We also found that neither clinical insight nor neurocognition were
significant moderators of the self-reported and clinician-rated motiva-
tion relationship. This aligns with prior work suggesting that meta-
cognition overlaps with but is separate from both clinical insight and
neurocognition (Lysaker et al., 2011; Nicolò et al., 2012) and that
neurocognition may be a building block for the more complex process
of metacognition (Lysaker et al., 2014a; Minor and Lysaker, 2014).
Indeed, basic levels of memory and processing speed are needed to
complete both self-report and clinician-rated motivation measures, but
these motivation measures go beyond the ability to accurately identify
the corresponding symbols and numbers or the ability to remember
specific numbers and letters. Similarly, these motivation measures re-
quire more than acceptance of one's illness and need for treatment.
Indeed, these motivation measures require not only awareness of one's
past intentions, desires, and emotions but also the ability to make sense
of these experiences and integrate them into a coherent representation
that the participant then needs to translate into a Likert scale option,
frequency, and/or verbal response. Thus, neurocognition and some
level of clinical insight may be necessary to complete these measures,
but greater agreement between self-perceptions and clinician motiva-
tion ratings may only arise when a person has a more integrated re-
presentation of themselves and others. However, it may also be that our
measures of clinical insight and neurocognition were not precise en-
ough or that other forms of insight or neurocognition not measured
here might moderate the self- clinician-rated motivation association;
future replications are needed with more comprehensive insight and
neurocognition measures such as the Scale for the Unawareness of Ill-
ness (SUMD; Amador et al., 1994) or the Measurement and Treatment
Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia (MATRICS;
Nuechterlein et al., 2008) Consensus Cognitive Battery.
This study has limitations. First, our sample was small, and our
findings may have been impacted by our inclusion criteria; additional
work should explore whether these findings generalize to those in a
more acute illness phase or those with a wider range of motivation as
measured by the CAINS. Further, given the cross-sectional data, we
were not able to investigate the direction or specific mechanism
through which relatively lower metacognition leads to a reduced re-
lationship between motivation measures. It may be that metacognition
reductions impact a person's ability to report motivation, impact the
rater's ability to assess motivation, or some combination of these fac-
tors. Finally, we examined the relationship between only two motiva-
tion measures; future work could examine whether metacognition also
moderates the relationship between additional motivation measures,
including performance-based measures.
In sum, our results suggest that participants' metacognition level
may be a key factor influencing the strength of the relationship between
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Fig. 1. Graph showing the relationship between self-reported and clinician-
rated motivation at different levels of metacognition.
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self-reported and clinician-rated motivation measures. Specifically, we
found that without at least essential metacognitive abilities, the re-
lationship between self-reported and clinician-rated motivation was
non-significant. However, as metacognition reached or surpassed this
level, the self-reported and clinician-rated motivation relationship be-
came significant and relatively stronger. Neither clinical insight nor
neurocognition significantly moderated the relationship between these
motivation measures, suggesting that metacognition plays a unique role
in the strength of this relationship. With replication, our results suggest
that using a metacognitive framework to guide assessment interviews
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2017) and directly targeting participants' me-
tacognition with interventions such as Metacognitive Reflection and
Insight Therapy (MERIT; Lysaker and Klion, 2017) may help to improve
the synchrony between self-perceptions and clinician motivation rat-
ings.
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